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Defining “Public Justice” in a
Pluralistic Society:1
Probing a Key Neo-Calvinist Insight
individual subject, a class or an entire society can
get out of the state, to the legitimacy of its commands and the rights its subjects retain in the face of
them.... These are vitally important matters.… Is it,
however, sufficient to treat them only from the point
of view of the subject, what he needs, wants, can
and ought to do? Would not our understanding
become more complete if we could also see them as
they might look from the state’s point of view?2

by Jonathan Chaplin

T

he French political theorist Anthony de Jasay
opens his book, The State, with an arresting question: “What would you do if you were the state?”
De Jasay is not asking what platform you would run
on if you were running for elected office but the
more difficult question of what criteria you, if you
imagined yourself as the institutional agent called
“the state,” would employ in deciding how to act. He
goes on as follows:
It is odd that political theory, at least since
Machiavelli, has practically ceased asking this
question. It has devoted much thought to what the
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This assertion finds a powerful echo in the political thinking generated by the Reformed tradition,
especially its neo-Calvinist wing. That tradition
opposes individualist or subjectivist approaches to
politics, which look to the state merely as a guarantor of individual interests, preferences, or rights, and
views it instead as a community with a normative
structure and calling. Representatives of this tradition urge us to take the reality of the state as an institutional agent with full seriousness and to ask ourselves how we, as active members of the state—as
citizens—should frame its central normative purposes. A wide range of resources is available to assist us
in doing so.3
De Jasay’s own response to his opening question is
shaped by a very influential methodology in political
science and public policy-making, namely rational
choice theory. That methodology supposes that criteria for what states should do can be identified by
analogy with the choices that a rational, self-interested individual might make, given a determinate set of
resources and constraints. This supposition, I believe,
is a deeply-flawed approach to the project of framing
the normative purposes of the state. Nevertheless, de
Jasay’s question is precisely the one we need to ask
today as our states undergo structural transformations
Pro Rege—March 2004 1

on a scale we have not yet seen.
Writers in the Reformed tradition answer that
question against the comprehensive background of a
biblical vision of creation, sin, redemption, and
human nature. The complex institution we have
come to call “the state” is neither merely a means for
sustaining social order nor an arbitrary social construct nor a mere instrument of individual self-interest; rather, it is a historical response to the inescapable
imperative arising with ourselves for just public relationships, an imperative rooted in the divinely created structure of human social order and reaffirmed in
redemption. Political community exists to secure,
for human beings, a lawful arrangement of their public interactions, embodying the requirements of justice. The defining purpose of political authority is
the constitution of a community embodying what
many in the neo-Calvinist community have come to
call “public justice.”
On this view, if you were the state—at least if you
correctly grasped the nature of your calling—you
would not be preoccupied with institutional survival
or expansion, nor with defending your own “national” interests against supposed competitors, nor with
redesigning your society from the top down according to some comprehensive ideological plan, nor
with trying to get away with doing as little as possible on the mistaken assumption that the best government is the least government. Rather, you would be
reflecting in a deep and sustained way on how to put
in place a web of just public relationships within
which your citizens, as individual persons and in
their multiple and diverse relationships, communities, and associations, could flourish in freedom and
responsibility. “Public justice” would be your guiding principle, whether you were deliberating on welfare reform, monetary policy, environmental pollution, or strategic defence. From a neo-Calvinist perspective, the awesome task facing Christian citizenship today, in all its many manifestations, is to bend
every effort to nudge the states with which we actually live a little bit closer to that divine calling.
The principle of “public justice” has become the
cornerstone of much neo-Calvinist reflection on politics—two organizations have emerged from
Reformed circles with this phrase in their name4—
but what exactly does it mean? Surprisingly, while
many will be familiar with the broad pattern of policy preferences that emerge from applying this prin-
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ciple, relatively little explicit reflection has been
devoted to elaborating its implications. This lack of
explicit reflection may be one reason why, notwithstanding this shared policy territory, significantly
contrasting specific policy stances have been
espoused by different neo-Calvinist thinkers and
groups, each claiming justification in terms of the
same principle.5 Such divergences cannot be wholly
avoided and, to some extent, may reflect a healthy
complementarity. They certainly cannot be removed
merely by a process of conceptual clarification. But
delving into the meaning of the key phrase “public
justice” may at least help towards constructive dialogue among adherents of diverging interpretations.
Each of the two terms in the phrase “public justice”
has a precise meaning which invites fuller elaboration, and I want to offer my own reading of what
they imply. I begin with the idea of “justice.”
The Meaning of “Justice” in “Public Justice”
It has been a hallmark of classical Protestant political thought to designate the divinely established purpose of the state as the establishment of “justice.”6
Typically, this designation has referred to the function of “retributive justice” alluded to in Romans 13,
although even early on some Protestant writers,
notably those on the more radical wing of the
Reformation (within which I include early
Calvinism and Puritanism), also included elements
of what we have come to call “social justice.” Some
contemporary evangelical Protestants have revived
and deepened this tradition and, partly in response to
the gauntlet thrown down by liberation theology,
have reminded us that biblical justice involves much
more than mere criminal retribution; it also involves
a satisfaction of the basic material needs of human
beings, especially for the poor.7 Justice has also
always been central to the Catholic understanding of
the purpose of the state, though this purpose is conceived more capaciously as promoting “the common
good,” with justice as one of its central dimensions
rather than as the uniquely definitive purpose of the
state. A useful distinction is then often made
between just relations among individuals—commutative justice—and just relations across different sectors of society—distributive justice.
Designating the state’s purpose as the promotion
of “justice,” in its various modes, carries, therefore,
a long historical pedigree in Christian thought.

However, as it functions within the neo-Calvinist
perspective, the content of “justice” has come to be
fleshed out in the light of distinctive, pluralistic
social theory which seeks to give priority to a recognition of many different kinds of legitimate social
relationship, community, and association, and the
rights and responsibilities attaching to them. While it
affirms the indispensable importance of individual
rights and duties, it also seeks to honour those of parents, families, churches, schools, corporations,
unions, and many other social bodies, as well as to
encompass the many diverse kinds of relationship
among them, such as those constituting highly complex webs of interaction like “markets.”
Adherents to this social theory therefore rejoice
that the reductionist liberal8 polarization between
state and individual, which has enfeebled political
thinking for so long, is now being superseded by a
richer account of the linkages among the state, the
market, and civil society. Yet even that account they
find wanting because of its liability to overlook
some of the vitally important qualitative distinctions
between very different entities falling within these
catch-all categories, such as that between charitable
bodies and churches, both of which are lumped
together as “institutions of civil society,” or that
between profit-making and non-profit enterprises, a
distinction concealed if the single term “market” is
used. The neo-Calvinist insistence is that every one
of the types of social body just mentioned deserves
recognition on its own terms, and that each contains
its own unique domain of rights, duties, and authorities—its own “sphere of justice,” to use Michael
Walzer’s phrase,9 or its own “sphere sovereignty,” to
invoke Abraham Kuyper’s.10 This model also enables
the various modes of justice I mentioned earlier—
retributive, commutative, distributive, social, and so
on—to be situated within a coherent framework that
resists attempts to reduce justice to only one of these
modes. To my mind, a large part of the appeal of a
neo-Calvinist concept of justice is that it provides
the best prospect of a comprehensive account of
these multiple spheres and modes of justice.11
The model is not, of course, without its detractors.
Let me mention briefly just one reservation sometimes entered against it. An important assumption
undergirding much of the social and political analysis of neo-Calvinist thinking, especially that influenced by the writings of Herman Dooyeweerd, is the

idea that institutional “differentiation” is an inherently good thing.12 For example, James Skillen frequently refers to our society as “differentiated” and
to the state as a “differentiated state.”13 The term
refers to the phenomenon of institutional autonomy
that, as many social theorists have observed, seems
to mark the modern age in comparison to pre-modern societies. For example, in the past, kinship
groups would exercise economic functions; churches, landed interests, or craft guilds would perform
political functions; political rulers would wield
ecclesial powers; families would arrange marriages;
and so forth. In modern society, by contrast, each of

To my mind, a large part of
the appeal of a neo-Calvinist
concept of justice is that it
provides the best prospect
of a comprehensive account
of these multiple spheres
and modes of justice.
these diverse social functions has come to be designated to separate institutions, each operating largely
independently of the others. Specific social functions are now correlated to specific institutions with
a degree of clarity and continuity not seen in earlier
cultures.
Neo-Calvinists like Kuyper and Dooyeweerd
regard this state of affairs not simply as some contingent Western historical development but as an
expression of the historical unfolding of our manysided divine callings. The plural structure of our
modern society reveals the multifaceted character of
our being made in the image of God.14 However, this
notion of differentiation has evoked the charge that
the biblical story of human cultural unfolding—the
human response to the cultural mandate—is here
being read through the filter of an essentially
Western, modernist interpretation of historical
development.15 For does it not seem to imply, so the
criticism goes, that cultures which are less differentiated than Western civilization are culturally immature, even perhaps less able to image God?
Evaluating particular cultures according to the norm
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of differentiation can be a hazardous enterprise, and
more work needs to be done to detach that norm
from a possible Eurocentric bias. Most of us would
be fairly certain that the independence of the church
from state control would everywhere be a healthy
development, and that some version of constitutional democracy is likely to deliver relatively more justice and stability than other governmental forms.16
However, in the light of current Western levels of
divorce, can we be entirely confident any more that
the institution of arranged marriages leads to less
healthy marriages than we have in the West? Or,
against the background of escalating levels of
Western social inequality, can we go on complacently assuming that the concentration of economic
activity within the extended family or local community or “guild” is necessarily less conducive to economic flourishing—as distinct from mere profit—
than the capitalist enterprise? Such questions can
only be adequately addressed with substantial input
from non-Western Christians.17
In any event, the point I want to stress here can be
supported even by those who cannot entirely endorse
the notion of differentiation as found in neoCalvinist political writings. That notion rests on a
particular Christian philosophy of historical development. My central point concerns how we assess
the institutions that we currently live with. It is that,
whatever else justice in our own society might
imply, it certainly involves honoring all the distinctive responsibilities and rights arising from the plural institutions of society. Recognising this plurality
distributes power and authority across many centres
of society and so helps preempt illicit and oppressive
concentrations of power in any one center, especially, in Western societies, the economy or the polity;
or, in “traditional” societies, especially the family,
tribe, or religious community. It also secures many
avenues of personal and social responsibility so that
persons and communities can flourish in diverse
ways corresponding to the multifaceted possibilities
of human nature.
But what precisely are the distinct responsibilities
and rights arising from the plural institutions of society? Unless we can answer this question with some
degree of specificity, designating the task of the state
as “promoting justice” won’t supply us any meaningful guidelines for what states should do. Justice
cannot be understood primarily as a procedural mat-
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ter or as a derivation from individual rights or as a
codeword for equality or as “respecting difference”
(though it may include elements of all of the above).
The content of justice, in this perspective, is given
by the legitimate responsibilities and rights of individuals, their plural communities and associations,
and those arising from the complex and diverse
interactions between each of these. So to know what
political justice means—what the role of the state
is—we have to understand the normative design of a
plural society, to discern what kinds of relationships
and activities are conducive to a flourishing human
social life, and what rights and responsibilities promote that flourishing. Certainly, working out the
idea of a normative design is inescapably demanding
and controversial in a society characterised by deep
spiritual and moral dissensus, a point to which I shall
return.
The Meaning of “Public” in “Public Justice”
As is evident above, we already have our work cut
out in clarifying the meaning of the term “justice.”
Our workload is not lightened when we attempt to
put some meaning into the term “public.” The point
of qualifying the justice for which the state is
responsible as “public” justice is to indicate in a
more explicit way both the scope of and the limits to
its legitimate authority. Many issues of justice pertaining to interpersonal relationships or within independent communities or associations, and many others besides, are properly dealt with by the agents
concerned and involve no recourse to political
authority. For example, when parents decide on the
choice of school for their children, it is prima facie
illegitimate for public officials to gainsay that essentially familial choice. And when private businesses
decide on the price of a product, no government,
prima facie, has the competence to override that
essentially economic judgment. The specific “sphere
of justice” associated with different kinds of community or association defines a space in which the
state should have no direct legal authority (which is
not to say that a community or association is
exhausted in its sphere of justice, as I shall soon
point out). These spheres of justice fall outside the
public competence of the state.
The term “public” is employed routinely in lawmaking, public policy, and judicial adjudication, often
in the context of an appeal to “the public interest.”

Yet the term cannot be defined independently of
some larger political theory within which it functions and which shapes its concrete employment. In
classical political thought, for example, the public
realm was regarded as including virtually everything
that fell outside the domestic sphere of the household. With that expansive definition, much of what
businesses, universities, and even churches do today
would be in line for potential state control. The way
the term functions in neo-Calvinist treatments, however, suggests a much tighter circumscription: the
public realm is that which falls outside not merely
the household but also the internal spheres of all the
multiple communities and associations that make up
the plural structure of society, as well as outside the
sphere of individual freedom. With this view, what
qualifies as public space is relativized as the many
non-political expressions of our social nature move
into the foreground.
But, some might ask, isn’t this simply a Christian
pluralist gloss on an essentially liberal definition, in
which an over-extended private realm forces the
public realm to the margins? Have we not capitulated to an eviscerated individualist notion of the public? I think not, for two reasons. First, the “private
sphere” is not just the sphere of the individual but
also a social sphere, a realm of multiple, independent
communities and associations and relational networks. Second, in this view the public realm is not
simply defined negatively as what is left over after
we take away the rights of individuals and communities; it also implies a positive task of establishing
an enabling environment that other social bodies
cannot supply.18 The “public interest” is not the sum
of private interests but rather one of the essential
conditions for the flourishing of those interests.
Indeed, a searching claim made by Skillen is that an
individualist definition itself harbours potentially
statist tendencies: “while libertarian individualists
argue for a minimalist government that maximizes
individual freedom regardless of inequalities, liberals at the other end of the spectrum can support
extensive governmental action that ‘interferes’ in
any area of life whatsoever to expand the autonomy
and equality of every individual. In other words, the
individualist foundation recognizes no boundaries
for government except individual freedom....”19
In the wake of two decades of what I think can
only be described as aggressive social engineering

by movements of the New Right, I think we must go
further and say that even libertarian (or neo-liberal)
individualists, contrary to their professed desire to
minimize government, are often ineluctably drawn
to endorsing big government in order to police the
socially disruptive consequences of what Pope John
Paul II, in his marvellous encyclical Centesimus
Annus, calls the “idolatry” of the market.20 This
“idolatry” explains why what he condemns as a
“radical capitalist ideology” can go hand in hand
with an enthusiasm for more public spending on and
a more aggressive deployment of police, prisons,
and the military. And it also helps explain how a

The public realm refers to
that social space within which
individuals and communities
or associations interact with
each other in ways that
transcend their own unique
rights and responsibilities.
well-intentioned desire to slim government down
can, paradoxically, bring about the increased centralization of the public sector. This “idolatry” explains
why a former British enthusiast of Thatcherism
(Simon Jenkins), now turning, disillusioned, to an
older, more organic form of conservatism, can write
a book entitled Accountable to None: The Tory
Nationalization of Britain.21
Thus, in Skillen’s words, the neo-Calvinist notion
of the scope of the “public” realm is neither a classical Greek nor a liberal individualist one: “the political
community is neither the all-embracing whole of
human self-realization... nor an unnatural intrusion
upon freedom.”22 The public realm refers to that social
space within which individuals and communities or
associations interact with each other in ways that transcend their own unique rights and responsibilities.
However, at what point do we enter the public
realm? This entry point is impossible to determine in
an aprioristic way, but we might put it this way: no
human activities are ever absolutely beyond the
scope of the public realm, but that realm does not go
“all the way down.” It does not envelope the unique
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“spheres of justice” of individuals or the various
social bodies, but embraces only one specific dimension—the public dimension—of such activities. So
while parents can choose their children’s school,
they do not exercise absolute sovereignty over their
children—as was more or less the case in the ancient
Roman pater familias. They must, for example,
respect the physical and emotional integrity of their
children, and where this integrity is seriously violated, a public offence has been committed that will
require action by the state. To put this point differently, we could say that children’s rights to physical
and emotional integrity do not derive from the family’s internal sphere of justice but from the children’s
public status as citizens. So when the arm of the state
removes a child from an abusive family, it is not
interfering in the internal rights of the family—
no family has the right to abuse its children—but
simply requiring parents to respect their children’s
public rights.
Likewise, businesses may determine pricing, production methods, and so forth, but they do not exercise absolute sovereignty over their employees—as
at times appeared to be the case in the mid-nineteenth-century industrial England from which Karl
Marx drew much of his incriminating evidence.
Businesses may not, for example, compel employees
to work excessive hours or dismiss them at will; and
today many governments have judged that businesses may not pay employees less than a minimally
decent wage. When restrictions on such supposed
absolute economic sovereignty were progressively
introduced into Western states, some employers and
their philosophical advocates cried foul and accused
governments of encroaching on their economic freedom. Regrettably, some who claim to represent a
neo-Calvinist view of the economy today still echo
that secularised, libertarian capitalist cry. In
Centesimus Annus, John Paul II reiterates the historic
reply of orthodox Christian social thought to such a
shrivelled notion of freedom: “freedom in the economic sector [must be] circumscribed within a strong
juridical framework which places it at the service of
human freedom in its totality....”23 I think we should
read this as a more formal statement of the old and
more evocative adage that “freedom for the pike is
death for the minnows.” Earlier popes might have
said that “commutative justice” should be balanced
by “distributive justice.” To use Skillen’s illuminat-
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ing metaphor, we could say that the economic freedom of the entrepreneur or shareholder must be
“interwoven” with the claims of other stakeholders
under the norm of public justice: “[P]ublic justice
means that everything interwoven in the public order
maintains rather than loses its unique identity, jurisdiction, competence, and authority before God. The
metaphor of ... interweaving suggests that the distinct
colors and textures of the different threads being
interwoven are all maintained.” And this interweaving must occur in such a way that “the public commons must not be stolen or dominated by one organization or group in society nor controlled by one or
another interest group for private advantage.”24
The purpose of the state, then, is given by the
principle of public justice: issues of justice arising
within the public realm are matters which the state
must address in some way. Those pertaining to the
spheres of justice of non-political bodies fall outside
its competence, as indeed do issues that may have
public scope but which evoke no questions of justice
(changing fashions, for instance). The seminal neoCalvinist insight at stake here is that the authority of
the state is “universal” yet not “exhaustive” or
“omnicompetent.” It is universal—it doesn’t stop at
the factory gate; but it is not omnicompetent—it
must respect genuine entrepreneurial freedom even
when addressing issues of public justice arising
within the factory gates.25 We might say that the
scope of the state’s competence is extensive—it in
principle can touch any area of society—but not
intensive—it may not compromise the irreducible,
non-transferrable authority of a social institution
arising from its “sphere sovereignty.”
Precisely how the process of political interweaving
takes place is a highly complex question, but something needs to be said about the process because this
process of interweaving is where concrete questions
of public policy start. For those who find themselves
impatient for policy outcomes and restless with the
elaboration of principles, it should be noted that
merely positing the norm of public justice is not supposed to tell us what to do but is supposed to put us
to work in devising policy stances that make it concrete. It is sometimes said that neo-Calvinism is more
prone to the peddling of abstract principles than are
most other religious traditions, and there is some
truth in this charge.26 However, the policy indeterminacy of a principle like public justice is a feature of

normative political principles in every political tradition. For example, socialist believers in the normative principle of social equality do not think that
detailed policy prescriptions flow directly out of that
principle, and, indeed, socialists disagree on whether
it implies a commitment to state ownership of the
economy. Similarly, traditionalist conservative
believers in the principle of social order do not
assume that this principle instructs them in the details
of how to reform a constitution.27 Normative political
principles are guideposts, not blueprints. Those who
find “public justice” to be an illuminating principle
for political action will need much more than a clear
understanding of its definition when they engage in
political action. They will need a sound grasp of the
empirical complexities, possibilities, and limits of
their own political system and of the diverse currents
of political opinion with which they will necessarily
find themselves in dialogue. They will also need a
firm hold on the techniques of political action. It is
true that contemporary democratic politics is increasingly being reduced to the profoundly unhealthy—
and undemocratic—techniques of opinion manipulation, logrolling, and fundraising. However, like every
other sphere of social activity, politics does indeed
have a technical side: how to develop a policy initiative, when to launch it, how to publicize and defend
it, whom to work with, and so on. Christian participants need to master these skills as much as anyone
else does.
There has been a tendency within neo-Calvinist
political thought to focus on broad legislative or constitutional objectives at the national level. But it is
important to recognise that the implementation of
public justice by the state will, and already does,
occur at many points in the political system and will
take numerous forms. 28 Public justice should govern
action at local, state, federal, and indeed transnational levels,29 and such public justice should be
the aim of actions taken by executive, legislative,
judicial, and other organs at all those levels. The
seeming impossibility of passing a fundamental
statute or constitutional amendment on, say, religious freedom, abortion, or social welfare should not
prevent citizens and their organizations from working through other routes potentially available to
achieve similar objectives (and more such routes
exist in the decentralized American political system
than in more centralized systems like Canada or the

UK). And in each level or organ, work toward public justice can require many different instruments:
constraints, commands, empowerments, conditions,
provisions, benefits, entitlements, and so forth. In
addition, statecraft guided by public justice should
also explore how the structure of state institutions
themselves need to be recrafted, such as by opening

Those who find “public
justice” to be an illuminating
principle for political action
will need much more than a
clear understanding of its
definition when they engage
in political action.
up new avenues of representation for those alienated
or effectively disenfranchised by the current system.
Which concrete route or proposal is most likely to
bring about a just public outcome is a matter of prudential judgment that takes all circumstances into
account.
In Christian thought, however, “prudence” is not
regarded as a morally neutral art that can be invoked
to bypass conflicts of principle, as if governing were
merely a matter of technique. Different political theories will weight each of the above elements very differently according to their particular ideological biases. Neo-conservatives and neo-liberals, for example,
will favour local and state levels over federal and
trans-national levels, judicial adjudication over
statute or executive discretion, empowerments and
entitlements over constraints and benefits, and so on.
What these ideologically-based differences imply is
that a major component of the statecraft called for by
a public-justice perspective will be the nurturing of a
Christian political prudence, one formed through the
seasoned, corporate political experience of addressing concrete issues like welfare reform in the light of
a public-justice approach. Such statecraft will strive
to avoid the neo-liberal distortion I just indicated as
well as those characteristic of liberal egalitarianism
or traditionalist conservatism or any other blinkered
reading of that design of society which expresses the
just and gracious rule of God.
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Conclusion
Let me return to—only to leave wide open—the
dilemma of how Christians might contribute to public debate on legally defining the distinctive rights
and responsibilities of the multiple social structures
of a plural society, those of schools, families,
churches, unions, and the state itself. Is it possible to
approach a workable democratic consensus on what
the role of government is in relation to all of these,
in a society marked by deep moral and spiritual
dissensus? Our society is characterised not only by
institutional or structural pluralism—a plurality of
distinct kinds of social body—but also by religious
or confessional pluralism—a plurality of spiritual
and moral perspectives on many fundamental
questions, including the nature of that very structural
plurality.30
As I remarked above, the rights and responsibilities of distinct social bodies cannot simply be
unproblematically read off social reality. Indeed
according to the dominant perspective in social theory today, these rights and responsibilities cannot be
read off reality at all but only read into reality, since
they are purely contingent social constructions.31
Constructivists affirm the valid insight, shared by
neo-Calvinism, that social institutions are widely
variable products of historical human action, while
they deny that such action is a response to norms
arising from the created design of human nature.
Deconstructionists go further by insisting that social
institutions not only are entirely human constructions but also necessarily serve to perpetuate systematically unjust power-relations. They too grasp a
vitally important point that is affirmed by neoCalvinism and that ought to be affirmed more consistently: social institutions can be established as, or
be distorted into, structures of oppression, illegitimate violence, or exclusion.32 Unlike deconstructionists, neo-Calvinists explain these distortions as a
consequence of the ubiquity of human sinfulness,
humankind’s rebellion against the normative design
of created order. Both have reason to expect deep
and pervasive distortions in even our apparently
most human social structures. However, the core
deconstructionist charge—that all social structures
are necessarily and ineradicably premised on violence
and oppression—forceful though it is, is ultimately
self-defeating if applied consistently to all social
constructions: the accusation of injustice against a

8 Pro Rege—March 2004

particular social power-relation can only stand if
there is some benchmark of what a just power relation would look like.33 So, notwithstanding their
denials, even deconstructionists end up having to
take an implicit position on what a normative distribution of social authorities would be.34
In any event, judgments on such issues are
increasingly controversial, as the intensity of the
debates, for example, over the public status of samesex unions35 or the nature of a fair global trading
regime36 make abundantly clear. In such a context,
Christians must, on the one hand, hold on tenaciously to the universal intent of their claims: we are, after
all, seeking to give some account (however provisional and open to challenge) of the structure of the
order of creation, not simply informing outsiders of
our own religious preferences. However, we can
hardly fail to notice that against the contemporary
background of radical confessional pluralism, those
universal claims are increasingly looking like, at
best, just one more proclamation of local, narrative
particularity or, at worst, just one more self-serving
interest-group demand.
In the light of these generalizations, Christian
political practitioners and thinkers need to acquire
not only a steady nerve and sure faith but also
sophisticated skills of inter-confessional civic dialogue and democratic coalition-building. This is the
worst possible moment to retreat into a defeatist isolation in which we aspire only to keep a flicker of
truth alive within an ecclesial community preoccupied with mutual consolation. Nor is this a time to
seek deliberately to stoke up culture wars in order to
precipitate some sort of political cataclysm that, we
wager, might trigger a moment of national conversion. It is a time for sustaining our vision, steadying
our nerve, working for approximations of justice in
the avenues that still remain open to us, and then living each day in the light of the hope that beckons us
forward.
But what realistic prospect exists of reaching
political agreement, never mind moral consensus, on
some of the contested questions that currently wrack
the body politic? The first thing to say is that this is
not a problem only for neo-Calvinist pluralists
(although it has to be admitted that they do make
work for themselves by laying out such a complex
arrangement of social furniture). Second, the divergence of perspectives arising from confessional

pluralism is far from complete: we must identify and
nurture whatever areas of agreement still survive.
And, third, we have reason to believe that such confessional divergence will never be complete: the very
structures of created order, revealing themselves
within the inclinations and hopes of human beings
everywhere, are continually sustained by God and
so, to some degree, are potentially recognisable by
all, whatever their confessional perspective. It is,
therefore, eminently worth devoting time and energy
to political dialogue with those with whom we have
profound confessional disagreements, whether secular liberals or orthodox Moslems. And it also goes
without saying that as Reformed Christians engage
in this dialogue, they will be able and will need to
learn from and cooperate with Christians from many
other confessional traditions (as Kuyper himself
discovered over a century ago).
Although we may increasingly feel that we are a
community in exile, we still have powerful reasons
for “seeking the welfare of the city” in which we
currently dwell. As we seek to discern the contours
of that welfare, we will need thousands of passionately committed and politically streetwise Christian
citizens, activists, and thinkers to devote themselves
to this patient, painstaking task. May the Lord of the
harvest of justice send out many laborers into his
harvest, for the gathering in may soon be upon us.
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